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Economic Principles and Determination of Infrastructure Third Party 
Tariffs in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
 
Professor Alex Kemp and Professor Euan Phimister 
 
1. Introduction:  History and Context    
 
The notion of the desirability of third-party access to infrastructure in the 
UKCS was established in the early years of North Sea oil and gas 
exploitation.  It was clearly understood that this could reduce the overall 
development costs of new fields.  Another early consideration was the 
avoidance of the proliferation of pipelines which were possibly being 
encouraged by the very high rate of tax relief against Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT) and corporation tax which included for PRT an uplift of 75% 
of the investment expenditure incurred.   
 
It was also acknowledged that the ownership of pipelines and other 
infrastructure of processing platforms and terminals could confer 
substantial local bargaining powers on the asset-owners in the negotiation 
of tariffs with prospective third-party users.  In recognition of this powers 
were taken by the UK Government in the Petroleum and Submarine 
Pipelines Act 1975 (PSPA 1975) which enabled the Secretary of State to 
determine such tariffs, but only if requested so to do by one of the parties.   
 
Over the years third-party use of the growing infrastructure has grown 
very substantially.  Where a new field investor required access to existing 
infrastructure this could be achieved by one of two mechanisms.  The 
new field investor could purchase an equity share in the pipeline or other 
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infrastructure and obtain access to the infrastructure as a consequence.  
The second way was simply to pay tariffs to the existing asset-owner.  
Generally (but not always) asset-owners preferred the second method.  
There was a preference to receive tariffs from competitors rather than pay 
tariffs to them.   
 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s the UK Government became 
increasingly aware that third-party tariffing was becoming quite a 
profitable activity, and in 1983 it passed legislation which amid some 
controversy applied PRT (as well as the existing corporation tax) to tariff 
income.  In acknowledgement of the need to encourage the development 
of new fields via third-party use of existing infrastructure a substantial 
tariff receipts allowance (TRA) for PRT was introduced for each new 
tied-in field.   
 
Over the years the scale of the infrastructure in the UKCS has continued 
to grow and with it the amount of third-party use.  The importance of 
such access is also much greater now because the small size of the 
majority of the new fields is such that a stand-alone development would 
often be uneconomic.  Overall production of both oil and gas is falling at 
a steady pace and there is a clear national need to encourage more new 
developments to ensure that maximum economic recovery be attained.   
 
Much of the existing infrastructure is now quite old and the need to 
maintain its integrity is a recurring issue.  With production declining from 
the fields for which the infrastructure was originally constructed, 
incentives to prolong the life of the infrastructure can be provided by the 
development of new fields via tie-ins.  In most of the large pipeline 
systems there is significant ullage available to receive more oil and gas 
3 
 
from new fields.  The basic context for many more third-party tie-ins is 
thus positive, and much is to be gained nationally by a more extensive 
and intensive use of the infrastructure.  Given the pace of decline of 
production the speedy conclusion of access terms are clearly desirable. 
 
2. Recent and Current Arrangements for Third Party Access 
 
For many years negotiated access between asset-owner and potential 
asset-user formed the basis for determining all the terms relating to third-
party use of the infrastructure in the UKCS.  The DECC and its 
predecessor bodies were generally involved on an informal basis and 
certainly made their views known.  The appropriate balance between the 
objectives of avoiding the undue proliferation of pipelines and 
encouraging competition among pipeline systems was one of the 
perceived problems.  The time taken to conclude negotiated agreements 
became a major issue and resulted in an Infrastructure Code of Practice 
being drawn up in 1996 by the industry and facilitated by the DTI.  While 
this constituted an improvement concern continued to be felt over the 
time taken to reach agreement and over the terms of agreements.  This 
resulted in a revised and more substantial Infrastructure Code of Practice 
(ICOP) being developed.  It was published in September 2004 under the 
auspices of PILOT the joint Government-industry consultative body.  The 
Code contains a number of principles.  Key ones are that (1) the parties 
will follow a Commercial Code of Conduct, (2) the parties will provide 
meaningful information to each other during negotiations, (3) the parties 
support negotiated access in a timely manner, (4) parties undertake to 
ultimately settle continuing disputes with an automatic referral to the 
Secretary of State, (5) parties resolve conflicts of interest, (6) 
infrastructure owners provide transparent and non-discriminatory access, 
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(7) infrastructure owners provide tariffs and terms for unbundled services 
where requested, (8) parties seek to agree fair and reasonable terms where 
risks taken are reflected in rewards, and (9) parties publish key, agreed 
commercial provisions.  The ICOP is maintained and its implementation 
regularly reviewed by OGUK.  With respect to the question of what 
constitutes fair and reasonable terms Section 12.1 of the ICOP states that 
(1) these should reflect the risks taken, and (2) are best secured by open 
competition between different infrastructure systems.  Section 2 of the 
ICOP states that the terms that could be determined by the Secretary of 
State are expected to be in line with those emanating from effective 
competition. 
 
Since 2004 UKOOA/OGUK has devoted considerable effort to 
streamlining the negotiation process and has, for example, published 
several Guidance Notes dealing with subjects such as (1) the Automatic 
Referral Notice (to the Secretary of State), (2) Statement of Requirements 
for each party, (3) Typical Plan for negotiation (Template) and (4) Access 
Agreement Summary. 
 
The DECC has also been active in this area and in April 2009 published 
Guidance on Disputes over Third Party Access to Upstream Oil and Gas 
Infrastructure.  Of key importance in the present context is the section 
dealing with the principles which DECC would employ in settling tariffs 
when disputes were referred to it.  This emphasises several points 
including (1) competitive prices, (2) the need for the payment to reflect 
the real costs, risks faced, and opportunities forgone.  It was recognised 
that there was a tension between on the one hand (a) settling terms which 
rewarded past investment in infrastructure (thus making the overall 
investment environment in the UK more attractive), and on the other hand 
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(b) making the terms attractive enough to encourage further exploration 
and development. 
 
The Guidance Notes see four distinct categories each of which may 
require different considerations in the determination of appropriate tariffs.  
The first relates to infrastructure built as part of an integrated field 
development project.  Two sub-categories were distinguished.  In the first 
spare capacity was available in infrastructure where provision had already 
been made for the capital costs to be recovered, including a reasonable 
return reflecting the costs and risks.  In these circumstances the DECC 
disposition is to set terms which reflect the incremental costs and risks 
borne by the infrastructure owner.  The second sub-category is where the 
field is near the end of its economic life.  In this circumstance the DECC 
view is that tariffs may have to be set in excess of incremental costs to 
ensure that the infrastructure is maintained and is available for third-party 
users.  The tariff terms should then provide for “appropriate” cost sharing. 
 
The second category identified by DECC refers to infrastructure 
deliberately built oversized with a view to procuring third-party business.  
In this situation the tariff terms would provide for the recovery of the 
capital costs incurred in the expectation of such third-party business.  The 
appropriate tariff would be that which was just sufficient to earn the 
asset-owner a reasonable return, taking into account the risks involved, on 
the costs incurred in the expectation of third-party business.  It was noted 
that this tariff could be higher than that which the owner might offer if the 
potential asset-user had alternative infrastructure options (including the 
first category noted above). 
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The third category identified by DECC is where there is noteworthy 
competition among potential asset-user for a limited infrastructure 
capacity.  In these circumstances the DECC view is that it would be 
unlikely to request the asset-owner to make the infrastructure available to 
a potential user who valued the capacity in question less than another 
potential user.  A consequence of the above is that agreed tariffs could 
generate some economic rent to the asset-owner. 
 
The fourth category identified by DECC is where the third-party business 
would result in the displacement of the asset-owner’s own production or 
other contractual obligations.  In this circumstance DECC would be 
unlikely to require third-party access.  If this were to happen the terms 
would have reflect the cost to the asset-owner of backing off his own 
production or that of another party to which he was contracted.  The 
economic concept of opportunity cost was relevant here. 
 
In summary the DECC view in the Guidance Notes is that, in the majority 
of cases where a determination had to be made, the appropriate tariff is 
likely to be that which would be offered by an asset-owner when faced 
with effective competition from other infrastructure owners who also had 
adequate ullage available in their system. 
 
3. Fundamentals of Third Party Tariff Determination 
a) Conceptual Framework 
Where natural (local) monopolies arise, it is most efficient for a 
product or service to be provided by a single producer rather than 
competing firms.  These characteristics appear particularly in 
industries with high fixed investment costs and low marginal (or 
incremental) costs such as those where network infrastructure is 
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important, e.g. gas, electricity water. While production efficiency 
arguments suggest that network infrastructure should be provided by a 
single firm, it has long been understood that, left unregulated market 
outcomes can embody other economic inefficiencies such as excessive 
pricing for access, under-provision of access etc.      While 
unregulated natural monopolies may lead to a range of undesirable 
outcomes,   it is well recognized that the regulation in such cases is 
complicated by the need to ensure reinvestment in infrastructure 
(Joskow, 2005).  The pricing of access to infrastructure and the 
efficiency of market outcomes may be further complicated when, as in 
many cases, there is also partial vertical integration, e.g. where the 
network infrastructure owner is also one of the potential users of the 
infrastructure (Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996).   
 
This section analyzes a simplified model of common infrastructure 
assumed to be desirable for the exploitation of a number of oil fields.   
The model is a version of the general natural monopoly model adapted 
to capture particular aspects of the potential interaction between 
exploitation of oil fields and common infrastructure.  This allows the 
conclusions from the general model to be seen more clearly in terms 
of the problem at hand.  Specifically, when the market pricing of 
access to the infrastructure can lead to inefficient non-exploitation of 
high cost fields, why imposing marginal (incremental) cost pricing can 
lead to inefficient under-exploitation of resources, and how the 
interaction between vertical integration between the infrastructure and 
a field operator may affect regulation. 
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The model presented focuses on outcomes for a given level of 
infrastructure.  Hence, the marginal costs discussed in the model cover 
short run incremental costs only.    In the long run the overall capacity 
of infrastructure available is also clearly variable. How this changes 
the conclusions for the efficient pricing of access to infrastructure is 
also discussed.  
Economic efficiency and therefore the government objectives are 
relatively easy to characterize in the context of oil which is a tradable 
commodity where it is realistic to assume the UK holds no market 
power.    In such a case, outcomes will be efficient if the net present 
value (NPV) of all profits from the UKCS are maximised.  Economic 
inefficiency will arise if different ownership patterns combined with 
market structure or regulation move the potential outcome away from 
the exploitation of resources implied by maximizing UKCS NPVs.    
 
The basic model presented draws on the traditional literature on the 
theory of regulation (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986), which assumes 
perfect information on costs and demand.  Modern regulation theory 
emphasises the imperfect and asymmetric nature of the information 
held by regulators and other economic actors, particularly in terms of 
costs, and the impact of effort exerted by firms on costs (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993).    While no attempt will be made to formalize these 
aspects, the impact of imperfect information in the basic model 
predictions will be discussed. 
 
b) Model 
The initial model examines a situation where there are three potential 
user oil fields and a pipeline infrastructure with excess capacity is 
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available.  The marginal cost of using the infrastructure is less than the 
average cost.  The three fields have different unit costs.  Consider 
three oil fields with potential output levels 1 2 3, ,q q q . The marginal 
(incremental) cost of oil from each field is given by fixed values 
1 2 3, ,c c c where 1 2 3c c c< < .  Output from each field could be transported to 
market via a single pipeline (which has capacity of at least 1 2 3q q q+ + ) 
and sold at an exogenously determined oil price, mp .   
 
Total costs for transporting oil are given by a aTC F c q= +  where q is the 
total output transported via the pipeline.  The fixed cost F combined 
with the constant marginal cost ac  means that the provision of the 
infrastructure service is a natural monopoly with falling Average 
Costs 
a
F cq +  which here always remain above marginal cost ac .    The 
fixed cost F should be interpreted as covering any cost which is 
effectively independent of the quantity of oil transported. Hence 
clearly the capital costs of original investment are included but also it 
may include certain short run costs which are required to maintain the 
capacity of the infrastructure.   
 
First, to characterize the efficient outcome where overall profits would 
be maximized, consider the case where all three fields and 
infrastructure are operated by a single firm.   If overall the fixed cost 
of the infrastructure is covered such that total revenues are at least as 
great as overall costs, the firm should operate any field where the 
marginal cost of transporting the oil ac  is less than the net revenue 
from producing the oil. The thresholds, 1mp c−  , 2mp c− , 3mp c−  are 
therefore the maximum pipeline costs at which Fields 1,2, and 3 
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would be viable, and represent the usage of infrastructure services at 
different costs .     
 
Figure 1 illustrates an example case where the efficient solution is that 
all three oil fields would operate.    
 
c) Potential Market Outcomes with No Regulation 
To illustrate the potential for inefficiency associated with a local 
monopoly in this context consider now the case where the fields are 
licensed to three separate operators, firms 1,2 and 3, and the 
ownership of the infrastructure is held by a private local monopoly.  
Each field licensee is assumed to profit maximize and therefore will 
only choose to operate from each field if marginal revenue is at least 
as large as the marginal cost from producing and transporting oil.  
Hence, Field 1 will operate if 1m ap c p≥ + ,  Field 2 if 2m ap c p≥ +  and 
Field 3 if 3m ap c p≥ + .   
 
Setting these relations as equalities defines the maximum access price 
at which each field will operate. Hence, in Figure 1, demand 
(willingness to pay) for pipeline access is characterized by the step 
function line with thresholds, 1mp c−  , 2mp c− , 3mp c− .  
 
If the infrastructure owner is constrained to charge a single access 
price ap  to the pipeline, the market solution may lead to an inefficient 
number of oil fields being exploited.   In the example, to maximize 
profits the infrastructure owner would choose either 1a mp p c= −  , or 
2a mp p c= − , or 3a mp p c= − .  Whether the latter efficient price is chosen 
depends on whether the loss in revenue from lowering the price for 
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existing fields is less than the gain in revenue from pricing to ensure 
that there is effective demand for access from higher cost fields.     
 
In the example illustrated in Figure 1, the infrastructure owner would 
choose 2mp c− as the single access price, as the loss of profit from 
moving to the efficient price 3mp c−  (Area D) is greater than the profit 
gain (Area G).  Hence, in this case the market outcome would lead to 
the inefficient under-exploitation of the oil resources.  .     
As the local monopoly access price depends on the final market oil 
price mp , where this market price is particularly volatile one would 
expect access contracts to be written with terms which vary explicitly 
with the final market price.  
 
In this simple setting, the efficient solution can obtained via the 
market by allowing the infrastructure owner to price discriminate and 
set individual access prices for each field.  In this case with perfect 
information, the infrastructure owner could set access 
prices 1mp c− , 2mp c− , 3mp c−  per unit transported for Fields 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, and hence capturing all the rents from the three oil fields 
(but ensuring development of all fields).    Alternatively, the 
infrastructure owner could set two-part tariffs, where each user pays 
an access fee (different across each user), and a separate charge equal 
to the marginal cost ac for each unit transported.  
 
In reality a number of factors undermine the ability of the price 
discriminating monopolist to generate the efficient solution via an 
unregulated market.   Importantly, as the development of each oil field 
involves significant sunk costs, there is a potential hold-up problem 
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which will reduce the licence holders’ incentives to invest.   In 
principle field marginal costs 1 2 3, ,c c c  would include elements to cover 
the opportunity cost for capital in field developments.  However, once 
licence holders have sunk capital in developing fields, the 
infrastructure owner would, with sufficient information, be able to 
extract any surplus above the short run marginal production cost, 
meaning that the licence owner would be better off if he did not invest.  
On the other hand, asymmetric information means field licence 
owners will have significantly better information on costs than the 
infrastructure owner.  As a result, the infrastructure owner may be 
unable to extract all rents from licence holders with lower costs 
(Salanie, 1998).     
 
Partial vertical integration with a single firm being both infrastructure 
owner and operator of one of the fields can affect the market outcomes 
if there is a single access price for the other operators.  Consider the 
case where the infrastructure owner also holds the licence to Field 1.  
Then, as before, the access price would be set at 2mp c− and Field 3 
would not operate.  However, if the infrastructure owner held the 
licence to the high cost Field 3, the access price would remain the 
same, but it would operate and transport the oil from Field 3 as the 
marginal cost of transport is below the marginal revenue from the field.    
 
d) Regulation in Model Framework 
The policy response to monopoly and in particular natural monopoly 
has been varied.  For example, within UK utilities industries, the 
historic solution was to use vertically integrated state monopolies.  
More recently this approach has been replaced by the unbundling of 
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such industries into segments containing markets which are potentially 
competitive, e.g. wholesale electricity and private monopolies 
controlling the network infrastructure but which are subject to price 
and other regulation (Newbury, 1999).    
 
In the simple local monopoly, if regulated prices can be set at 
marginal cost of transporting oil, regulation should in principle restore 
economic efficiency.  However, decreasing average costs in the 
natural monopoly case mean that the infrastructure owner will make a 
loss at marginal cost prices and the regulator would have to provide a 
subsidy to ensure that the service is provided.   
 
Figure 2 illustrates this with respect to the simple example model.  
Setting the regulated access price as R
a pp c=   then, as in the efficient 
solution, all three fields will operate.  At this price and quantity, 
average cost is greater than average revenue and the infrastructure 
owner makes a loss of area B + D + G. In contrast, all three field 
operators make profits of (A+B), (C+D), and (E+G) for Firms 1, 2 and 
3 respectively.  Hence, to ensure that the infrastructure owner operates 
the pipeline facility, the regulator must provide a subsidy of B + D + 
G.  Such subsidies are difficult to achieve politically and ignore the 
wider economic inefficiencies induced arising from raising taxes to 
finance them (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  
 
Partial vertical integration with a single firm being both infrastructure 
owner and operator of one of the fields, allows implicit profits from 
field operation to be set against the fixed cost of the common 
infrastructure.   For example, if the infrastructure owner also holds the 
licence to Field 3, while the profit E+G remains above the fixed cost F, 
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the infrastructure owner will operate both field and infrastructure.   
However, in the case where a single field operator bears the total fixed 
cost of the infrastructure, this will lead to premature (from an 
economic efficiency perspective) abandonment of the field and 
infrastructure.   In Figure 2 this would occur if the infrastructure 
owner holds the licence to Field 3 where profit E+G is less than the 
fixed cost, but the fixed cost is less that total profits across all fields 
( (A+B)+ (C+D)+( E+G).   
 
Where, as in the case of the UKCS, subsidy from the regulator is 
infeasible, the second best regulation prices are found by maximizing 
overall profit from the fields subject to the constraint that the 
infrastructure owner must not make a loss.  In the case of a single 
homogenous service this leads to average cost or cost of service 
regulation, where the regulator sets the access price equal to the 
average cost of the operation of the infrastructure.  In Figure 2 this 
implies ( )1 2 3rap AC q q q= + + .  At this price, by definition, the 
infrastructure average cost (which include opportunity costs of capital) 
and revenue are equal, and therefore the infrastructure will operate.  A 
similar result holds under partial vertical integration where the 
infrastructure owner is also a user of the infrastructure operation 
(Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). 1 
 
It should be noted that second best average cost prices can lead to 
premature abandonment of higher cost fields. This would occur if 
average cost was sufficiently above marginal cost.  For example, this 
                                                            
1  Note this result does depend on the assumption that the product market is competitive.  In other cases, the 
implications may be different.  For example, if the product market is regulated the best pricing rule in the 
presence of vertical integration is the efficient component pricing rule which effectively states that the price of 
access should equal the incremental cost of access plus any opportunity cost in terms of lost profit  (see for 
example, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996).    
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would happen in Figure 2 if the average cost curve rose above 3mp c− .  
The third field would not operate at average cost prices even if 
marginal cost was below this level. 
 
The simple model presented underlies the traditional approach to 
regulation.  However it assumes that the regulator is able to accurately 
assess the firm’s costs and behaviour.  Modern regulation theory 
emphasises the limitations of all pricing rules, including cost of 
service, due to the asymmetric nature of information between the 
regulator and the regulated firm.  In particular, it explores the nature of 
the trade-off between preventing the regulated firm making excess 
profits and the firm’s efficiency Joskow, 2005).     
 
The asymmetric information issues which arise can be simply 
illustrated using the cost of service/average cost pricing as an example.  
Assume the Regulator wishes to fix the price equal to average cost.  
Clearly the “correct” level depends on the regulated firm’s costs, 
information which the firm holds but may be imperfectly available to 
the regulator.  In this case the regulated firm (infrastructure owner) has 
incentives to convince the regulator that their costs are as high as 
possible.  In part what is known as the adverse selection problem can 
be addressed via auditing, and an important part of regulation has been 
defining transparent, common accounting procedures which regulated 
firms have to follow.  Auditing, therefore, does reduce the ability of 
regulated firms to gain excess profits.  However, it has no impact on 
the so-called moral hazard problem.  If it is assumed that the firm’s 
costs (and therefore average costs) can be reduced by cost effort by the 
firm, e.g. via extra R&D, managerial effort, which cannot be perfectly 
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observed by the regulator, the effect of average cost pricing is to 
eliminate any incentive that the regulated firm has to reduce costs.   
 
e) Long Run 
The model presented above focuses on outcomes for a given level of 
infrastructure, where therefore marginal costs cover short run 
incremental costs only.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the model that 
where a given level of new investment (reinvestment) is required, 
regulation which prices access to the infrastructure at the short run 
marginal cost may not provide sufficient incentive for (re)-investment 
( R
a pp c= . in Figure 2) for infrastructure owners and developers.   
 
In long run decisions, the overall capacity of infrastructure available is 
also clearly variable.  Decisions on overall capacity may arise either 
where new fields require new infrastructure or where reinvestment in 
existing capacity is needed due to depreciation of existing assets.  In 
such circumstances, the efficient access prices would include the 
marginal costs of providing capacity.  The difference in the access 
price required for short run and long run efficiency may be interpreted 
as analogous to the implications of peak load pricing (Joskow, 2005).  
In the short run, existing capacity does not constrain the outcome, and 
therefore if the infrastructure owner would operate at short run 
marginal cost prices, these are efficient.  Where investment in capacity 
is required, (i.e. it does constrain the outcome), the access price must 
cover marginal investment costs in order to ensure an efficient level of 
infrastructure (re)investment. 
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f) Regulation in Practice and Cost of Service 
Particularly in the US, average cost pricing or cost of service 
regulation has been the traditional method used by regulators to 
manage the trade off between trying to ensure private natural 
monopolies do not exploit their position while having sufficient 
incentive to provide the level of service demanded (Joskow, 2005).   
 
In the UK the private monopolies created via the process of 
privatisation and deregulation in the utility industries in the 1980’s 
and 1990s have been typically regulated via price caps (Newberry, 
1999).  This was an attempt to take more systematic account of the 
incentives which regulation gives to reduce costs (or not).  In this 
system the regulator sets an initial Price op  and x a target productivity 
factor and then prices for a fixed period are governed by a formula 
such as ( )1 trt op p RPI x= + − .  Hence, within the period the regulated firm 
gains any cost savings achieved. However, elements of cost of service 
pricing remain important within this system as the setting of initial 
price op   depends in many cases on agreed profiles of capital and 
operating expenditure for regulated companies   (see for example the 
regulation of UK Regional Electricity distribution companies RECs  
(Joskow, 2006; Pollit and Bialek, 2008). 
 
The implementation of a cost of service type of approach to regulation 
can be characterized by two steps. First, there is a determination of the 
regulated firm’s total allowable revenue or cost of service, and 
secondly the tariff structure.  Total allowable revenue (or total revenue 
requirements)  is estimated typically including allowance for 
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“reasonable” operating expenditure, depreciation, an allowable rate of 
return on some defined capital base (regulatory asset value) plus other 
costs (Joskow, 2005).  The tariff structure is then set so that the 
discounted value of predicted total revenue of the regulated firm’s 
activities covers this value.   For example, in the regulation of UK 
Regional Electricity distribution companies,  the values of  x and op  
are chosen so that the present value of total predicted revenue for each 
firm equals the present value of total allowable revenue (Joskow, 
2006; Pollit and Bialek, 2008).   
 
When regulated, access to network infrastructure does typically 
include cost of service elements.  In the UK as discussed above access 
charges to the regional distribution electricity networks includes cost 
of service elements in setting initial prices for each regulator period.  
Similarly, although rather ad-hoc, the method of setting electricity 
transmission charges by National Grid aims to partially cover 
infrastructure cost (Pollit and Bialek, 2008).  Although currently not 
regulated in the UK, in the US pipeline rates for interstate transport of 
oil have been controlled since the Hepburn Act in 1906.  The 
methodology used here to set rates includes a cost of service element 
covering operating and capital expenditure or a market based rate 
where the pipeline operator can evidence sufficient competition 
(FERC, 2010). 
 
4. DECC Guidance and Access Tariff Determination 
 
As noted above the current DECC guidance on dispute resolution over 
Third Party Access to Oil and Gas Infrastructure (DECC, 2009) set out a 
number of principles which the Secretary of State will use to set access 
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tariffs including supporting the principle of non-discriminatory access, 
which would appear to preclude price discrimination by infrastructure 
owners.  The ICOP also states that tariffs should be non-discriminatory.  
Further, the principles of pricing access in the DECC Guidance (DECC, 
2009, page 13) are discussed with reference to a number of different 
scenarios, which may be interpreted with respect to different cases in the 
simple model set out above.   
 
Firstly, for “infrastructure built as a part of an integrated field 
development”, terms would normally reflect incremental costs except 
where the field is near the end of its economic life in which case “third 
party access may need to be set above incremental costs to ensure it is 
maintained”.  When this becomes insufficient due to the depletion of the 
field(s) owned by the operator, the fixed costs/access price will then be 
set at a cost of service level covering operating expenditure  (DECC,2009, 
p13).  In this scenario, the fixed costs F discussed in the model only cover 
operating expenditure with the initial investment cost deemed to be 
sufficiently depreciated to be discounted.  Hence, referring to Figure 2, 
this may be interpreted as implying that regulation would initially set the 
access price equal to marginal cost relying on partial vertical integration 
of infrastructure ownership with field operation to ensure that the fixed 
costs of the infrastructure are covered.   When sufficient field depletion 
has occurred in the field licensed by the infrastructure owner, the access 
tariff would then have to be reset to a cost of service level.   
 
In the second DECC scenario, where infrastructure operators can make a 
case that infrastructure was built or “maintained with a view to taking 
third party business”, a cost of service access price would be set covering 
both operating expenditure and return on capital.  In terms of the model, 
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this suggests that fixed costs F cover both operating and capital costs in 
this case due to the fact that this involves significant new or recent 
investment by infrastructure owners.  
 
While consistent with the traditional model of regulation (and the simple 
model presented above) i.e. assuming perfect information, the varying 
principles for access price setting suggested for different situations will 
pose challenges for the regulator when information is less than perfect.  It 
is of course important to recognize, as modern regulation theory suggests, 
that it is not possible to ensure efficiency and extract all possible excess 
profit from regulated firms.  However, the different principles provided 
by DECC may provide potential perverse incentives for infrastructure 
owners.  For example in certain circumstances, it may be in their interests 
to bring forward plans for the shutdown of its field(s) in order to ensure a 
move to cost of service access pricing.   Similarly the distinction between 
infrastructure maintained (or not) for third part business would appear to 
provide some incentive to overinvest in infrastructure maintenance in 
order to move to a pricing regime which covers capital costs. 
  
5. Taxation and Regulated Tariffs 
 
The prospect of the introduction of cost-related tariff determination in the 
UKCS raises the question of the appropriate tax treatment of tariff 
incomes.  The historic situation was described in Section One above.  
This, of course, applied to a situation where the tariffs were determined 
purely by negotiation between the infrastructure owner and field 
developer.  The abolition of PRT on tariff incomes relating to new 
contracts was introduced to enhance the competitiveness of the UKCS 
generally including the ability to contract for gas imports from Norway 
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through infrastructure located in the UKCS.  There was implicit 
recognition that the size of the tariff was influenced by the taxation 
applied to the related income. 
 
In the situation where tariffs are determined on a cost-related basis there 
has to be recognition of the tax payable on the income and the tax relief 
given for expenditures incurred in providing infrastructure service to third 
parties.  Currently the tariff income is taxed at 50% (corporation tax (CT) 
at 30% and Supplementary Charge (SC) 20%) and the associated 
expenditures are relieved at the same rates.  In general in a situation of 
infrastructure regulation the requirement to pay income taxes is taken into 
account by regulators in tariff determination.  The size of the tax 
payments is a relevant consideration. 
 
The present situation in the UKCS should be seen in this context.  There 
can be no doubt that corporation tax should apply to tariff incomes along 
with all other sources of corporate income, and that this should be 
acknowledged in tariff determination.  But the application of SC to tariff 
incomes and its inclusion in cost-related tariff determination is very 
questionable.  It could mean that tariffs are higher than they otherwise 
would be and result in economic recovery of oil and gas from potential 
user fields being reduced.  The increased operating costs for user fields 
could accelerate the economic cut-off from such fields or even cause the 
non-development of marginal fields. 
 
In the above circumstances there is a case on economic efficiency 
grounds for removing the SC on tariff incomes where the tariff is 
determined on a cost-related basis.  It is arguably inconsistent to 
determine tariffs in this manner while levying SC on the income in 
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question.  Given that tariff determination on a cost-related basis is just 
starting the appropriate mechanism could be to remove SC from new 
third party contracts from a specified date.  This should help to 
incentivise third party infrastructure agreements and encourage maximum 
economic recovery from the UKCS. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper an economic model has been developed to show the 
potential effects of third party tariffing of new oil/gas fields with an 
infrastructure owner who has some local monopoly powers.  It has been 
demonstrated that, in the absence of any regulation at all, negotiations 
between the parties may not always lead to an economically efficient 
solution (which is the maximisation of economic recovery from the 
UKCS).  An efficient solution could be procured by a scheme of 
discriminatory tariffs based on the willingness to pay of the users.  This 
could ensure that even marginally attractive fields are developed.  But 
this outcome depends on full knowledge by the infrastructure owner of 
the field owners’ costs.  Further, if price discrimination by the 
infrastructure owner is not permitted (as is the case with the ICOP and 
DECC Guidance) the result can be that the costs of infrastructure 
operation are not covered.  Non-discriminatory marginal cost tariff 
determination in a typical situation where the marginal cost of providing 
infrastructure services is below the average cost can be non-optimal and 
could lead to the premature closure of the infrastructure, and thus 
incomplete economic recovery.  In these circumstances tariff 
determination by a regulator can lead to an economically more efficient 
solution with enhanced oil and gas recovery.  Average cost pricing 
ensures that all the infrastructure costs are covered.  It should be 
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recognised, however, that this is a second best solution and the resulting 
tariffs could still render a field uneconomic compared to marginal cost 
pricing.  But in the absence of discriminatory pricing or subsidies this 
second best solution is the best that can be obtained.  In the longer term 
where further investment in the infrastructure is required to maintain or 
enhance its integrity for use by third parties the necessary costs need to be 
reflected in the tariffs.  In a situation where tariffs are determined on a 
cost-related basis the requirement to pay corporation tax on tariff income 
has to be acknowledged.  But the payment of Supplementary Charge on 
tariff incomes and the associated reflection of that in tariffs charged is 
inconsistent and non-optimal, and could lead to incomplete economic 
recovery from the UKCS.  There is thus a case for abolishing the 
application of SC to new third party tariff contracts in the UKCS.   
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